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Recent Decision
Hearst Corporation v. Hughes-The Presumption of Injury to
Reputation in Per Se Defamation Actions Is Not Dead
In Hearst Corp. v. Hughes,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that, in an action for negligent defamation per se, a plaintiff
could recover damages for emotional distress, despite the absence
of proof of injury to reputation.2 Injury to reputation is considered
the gravamen of defamation.' At common law, proof of such injury
was not required in cases actionable per se, in which there existed a
presumption of injury to reputation.4 However, in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,5 the United States Supreme Court held that negligent
defamation plaintiffs may no longer recover damages based on this
presumption. 6 In Hearst, the Maryland court addressed for the first
time the question of whether, in light of Gertz's effect on the pre-
sumption, plaintiffs in negligent defamation per se actions who
prove only emotional injury and not injury to reputation should be
denied recovery for failure to prove an essential element of the tort.
The court held that such plaintiffs still have a cause of action in defa-
mation.7 The court reasoned that the Gertz holding only goes to the
issue of damages, not to what constitutes a cause of action, and thus
the presumption can still function to supply the essential element of
defamation: injury to reputation. 8
1. 297 Md. 112, 466 A.2d 486 (1983).
2. Judge Davidson entered a dissenting opinion in which she was joined by Judge
Eldridge. Id. at 132, 466 A.2d at 496 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
3. See, e.g., W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at
737 (5th ed. 1984) ("defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good
name"); see also 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,JR., THE LAw OF TORTS § 5.1, at 349-50 (1956);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1976).
4. Defamation per se generally included all libel actions and certain categories of
slander. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569-570 (1976). In such cases, plaintiffs
could recover for the presumed injury to reputation without proving any actual damage.
1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 3, § 5.30, at 468. In addition, plaintiffs in per se
actions could recover for their emotional distress without proving injury to reputation.
Id. at 470; W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, supra note 3, § 112, at 794. For a full discussion,
see infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
5. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
6. Id. at 349-50.
7. 297 Md. at 130-31, 466 A.2d at 495.
8. Id. at 127, 466 A.2d at 494.
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I. THE CASE
In July 1975, Dawn Rottman purchased a new car from Forty
West AMC/Jeep, Inc. The car developed serious mechanical de-
fects that numerous visits to the dealer failed to correct. In August
1976, the assets but not the liabilities of Forty West were purchased
by Security AMC/Jeep, Inc., and the plaintiff Hughes was made op-
erating manager of the dealership.9 Following this change in own-
ership and management, Rottman brought her car to the dealer for
service on several further occasions, but the car broke down perma-
nently in July 1977.10 The alleged defamation occurred when Rott-
man appeared in a short filmed commentary broadcast on a station
owned by the defendant, Hearst Corporation. In the broadcast,
Rottman complained about the poor performance of the car and the
inadequate service she had received, and accused Hughes of having
sold her a "deathtrap"."
Hughes sued Hearst, alleging defamation. The trial court held
that Rottman's statement was defamatory in that it disparaged
Hughes' conduct of his trade, business or employment (one of the
traditional categories of per se defamation)' 2 , and that Hearst was
negligent in broadcasting the statement.' 3 The court also found
that the statement was false because Hughes had not sold the car to
Rottman. On the question of damages, the court found no pecuni-
ary loss or injury to reputation, but awarded Hughes compensatory
damages for personal humiliation and mental anguish.' 4 While an
9. Id. at 114, 466 A.2d at 487.
10. Id. at 115, 466 A.2d at 487. Hughes obtained special authorization to perform
warranty service on the car, even though the warranty had expired, and neither Security
nor Hughes had sold the car to Rottman. Id.
11. Id. at 115-16, 466 A.2d at 488. The commentary began "Dear Mr. Wayne
Hughes: . . . Remember when I bought my new 1975 AMC Matador on July 9, 1975
and was explained your great buyer protection plan." Id. at 116, 466 A.2d at 488. The
commentary complained that the engine began cutting out while the car was being
driven, and that 19 trips to the service center had failed to cure the problem. It went on
to describe an incident in which the engine died, rendering the power brakes and power
steering useless, while Rottman was driving 55 miles per hour on a highway. The com-
mentary concluded:
I have to go to court to try to get out of this death trap and get a car instead of a
toy that plays with peoples' lives from AMC. Mr. Hughes, here's one person
you could offer a camera and calculator to and I still wouldn't buy another
AMC product.
Id.
12. For a discussion of per se defamation, see infra notes 26-34 and accompanying
text.
13. 297 Md. at 116-17, 466 A.2d at 488.
14. Id. at 117, 466 A.2d at 488.
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appeal was pending in the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of
Appeals granted certiorari.1 5
The major issue before the Court of Appeals was whether,
under Maryland law after Gertz, a plaintiff can still recover in cases of
negligent defamation per se without proving injury to reputation.
Gertz had limited recovery in negligent defamation to compensation
for "actual injury", thus prohibiting the award of damages based on
the common law presumption of injury to reputation.' 6 Hearst ar-
gued that Gertz had thus abolished the presumption of injury to rep-
utation, and that, in cases like the present one, in which only
emotional harm is proven, plaintiffs should be denied recovery for
failure to prove the essential element of the tort.17
Rejecting Hearst's argument, the Court of Appeals held that
plaintiffs need not prove injury to reputation in cases of negligent
defamation per se.' 8 The court took the view that Gertz had not
abolished the common law presumption of injury to reputation,
finding that the "actual injury" holding in Gertz only went to the
issue of damages, not to the issue of what constitutes a cause of ac-
tion in defamation. t9 For support, the court looked to authorities
holding that the "actual injury" requirement does not extend to the
award of nominal damages, and argued that based on these authori-
ties a negligent defamation action is still possible without proof of
harm to reputation.2" The court also mentioned as a policy consid-
eration the need to relieve plaintiffs of the difficult burden of prov-
ing injury to reputation.2 ' Based on its holding that injury to
reputation need not be proven, the court affirmed the award to the
plaintiff Hughes. 2
15. Id.
16. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974).
17. 297 Md. at 126, 466 A.2d at 493.
18. Id. at 130-31, 466 A.2d at 495.
19. Id. at 127, 466 A.2d at 493-94.
20. Id. at 127-29, 466 A.2d at 493-95.
21. Id. at 129-31, 466 A.2d at 495.
22. Id. at 132, 466 A.2d at 496. A side issue was whether Hearst was entitled to an
absolute privilege for a "pure" opinion, as defined in the Restatement: "The simple ex-
pression of opinion, or the pure type, occurs when the maker of the comment states the
facts on which he bases his opinion of the plaintiff and then expresses a comment as to
the plaintiff's conduct, qualifications or character." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 566 comment b (1976). Hearst contended that Rottman's commentary merely ex-
pressed an opinion about AMC's product and warranty service, and maintained that this
opinion was of the "pure" type because the commentary set forth the facts underlying
the opinion (the date that Rottman bought the car, the fact that the car malfunctioned,
and Rottman's attempts to have the car repaired). 297 Md. at 131-32, 466 A.2d at 496,
The Restatement maintains that there is an absolute privilege for "pure" opinions under
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II. BACKGROUND LAW
A. Common Law
The torts of libel and slander are grouped together under the
general heading of defamation.23 Defamation law "protects the in-
terest in reputation-the interest in acquiring, retaining and en-
joying a reputation as good as one's character and conduct
warrant."'24 An action in defamation requires proof of communica-
tion by the defendant of defamatory words concerning the plaintiff
to a third person. To be defamatory, the words must be injurious to
plaintiff's reputation.2 5
the first amendment, based on the Supreme Court's holding that "under the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may
seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience ofjudges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974),
discussed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 comment c (1976). The Court of
Appeals noted, however, that Hearst failed to contend at trial that the commentary was
not directed towards Hughes, and that as applied to Hughes the commentary was found
by the trial court to contain false and defamatory statements of fact. Thus, even if such a
privilege exists under Maryland law, the privilege for "pure" opinion could not apply in
this case. 297 Md. at 132, 466 A.2d at 496.
23. W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, supra note 3, § 11, at 771. Although it is "difficult to
describe with precision the two forms of defamation, slander and libel," RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 comment b (1976), libel can be defined as "publication of
defamatory matter by written or printed words, by its embodiment in physical form,"
while "[s]lander consists of the publication of defamatory matter by spoken words." Id.
§ 568. The Hearst court found it unnecessary to characterize the mode of publication in
this case (oral statement made over television) as anything but defamation, because de-
fendant's statement affected plaintiff in his business, trade, or profession and was there-
fore actionable per se as either libel or slander. 297 Md. at 118, 466 A.2d at 489; see infra
notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
24. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 3, § 5.1, at 349.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558-559 (1976); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra note 3, § 5.1; W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, supra note 3, § 111, at 773. It is unclear
whether it is necessary that there be actual injury to reputation, or whether it is sufficient
that the words be of the sort that would tend to injure reputation. On the one hand,
Prosser and Keaton state that "defamation is ... that which tends to injure 'reputation'
. .W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, supra note 3, § 111, at 773 (emphasis added). More-
over, the Restatement declares that "[t]o be defamatory, it is not necessary that the com-
munication actually cause harm to another's reputation .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 559 comment d (1976). On the other hand, Harper and James state that the
plaintiff "must show that his reputation has been hurt and that his standing in the com-
munity in which he lives has been impaired." 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 3,
§ 5.1, at 349-50. The confusion on this point may be a function of the peculiar damage
rules in defamation, discussed at infra, notes 26-34 and accompanying text. Because of
these rules, injury to reputation was present in all defamation cases, either as a presump-
tion (in cases of libel and slander per se) or as the cause of the special damages that
plaintiff was required to prove in all other cases. Since injury to reputation was always
present, it is difficult to say whether it was essential to a cause of action in defamation, or
merely incidental to the damage rules.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Defamation law is notable for its peculiar damages rules. In
some types of defamation cases there existed at common law a pre-
sumption of injury to plaintiff's reputation, on the basis of which a
jury could award "general" damages, unsupported by proof of any
actual injury.26 Whether the presumption attached depended on
the nature of the defamation, especially on whether it was slander or
libel.
For slander, the presumption existed only in cases of slander
per se, that is, cases in which the defamatory words fell into one of
four categories: words imputing a crime; words imputing a loath-
some disease; words affecting plaintiff in his business, trade or pro-
fession; and words imputing unchastity to a woman.2 7 In cases of
slander per se, plaintiff could recover damages without proving in-
jury. In all other slander cases, plaintiff was required to prove "spe-
cial" damages-i.e., damages supported by specific proof 28 The
special damages were required to be pecuniary in nature, and to re-
sult from conduct of a third person caused by the communication of
the defamatory words.2 9 Once the case was shown to be actionable
per se or special damages were proven, plaintiff could recover for
other types of damage, such as emotional harm and resulting physi-
cal harm. °
In contrast to slander cases, libel cases were traditionally ac-
tionable per se in all instances. 1 Some jurisdictions, however, have
held that the presumption does not exist in cases of libel "per
26. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 3, § 5.14, at 387-88; id. § 5.30, at 468; W.
PROSSER & W. KEATON, supra note 3, § 112, at 788, 795; see Newbold v. Bradstreet, 57
Md. 38, 52-53 (1881).
27. W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, supra note 3, § 112, at 788; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 570 (1976).
28. M & S Furniture v. DeBartolo Corp., 249 Md. 540, 544, 241 A.2d 126, 128
(1968); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 3, § 5.14, at 387-88; W. PROSSER & W. KEA-
TON, supra note 3, § 112, at 793.
29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 575 comment b (1976); 1 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, supra note 3, § 5.14, at 388-89; W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, supra note 3, § 112, at
794-95. The requirement that special damages be pecuniary originated in the ancient
division between common law and ecclesiastical law; the jurisdiction of common law
courts over defamation depended on the presence of "temporal" or pecuniary damages,
as opposed to "spiritual" damages. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 575 comment b
(1976); W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, supra note 3, § 112, at 788. Prosser suggests that the
categories of slander per se probably derived from "a recognition that by their nature
such words were especially likely to cause pecuniary, or 'temporal' rather than 'spiritual'
loss." W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, supra note 3, § 111, at 788.
30. See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 3, § 5.14, at 388-89; W. PROSSER & W.
KEATON, supra note 3, § 112, at 794.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 (1976); W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, supra
note 3, § 112, at 795-96 ("Where there has been a publication of defamatory matter to
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quod", i.e. cases in which the defamatory meaning of the libel is
only apparent with reference to extrinsic facts.3 2 In such cases these
states would require proof of special damages. 33 As with slander,
once the case was shown to be actionable per se or special damages
were proven, plaintiff could recover for other types of damage.3 4
B. Constitutional Law
The common law of defamation has been affected by recent
Supreme Court decisions establishing safeguards for the first
amendment rights of defendants. This line of cases begins with New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 5 in which the Supreme Court held that the
first amendment "prohibits a public official from recovering dam-
ages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct un-
less he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."36 In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,3 7 the
Court extended the New York Times rule to cover "public figure"
plaintiffs as well as public officials.3"
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,3 9 the Supreme Court established
constitutional safeguards for media defendants being sued by non-
public figure plaintiffs. The Court held that there can be no liability
without fault in defamation, and that the states may decide for them-
selves what the standard of fault should be.4' The Court also held
the general public, it is rational to presume or assume that there has been some harm to
reputation .... ").
32. Thompson v. Upton, 218 Md. 433, 438, 146 A.2d 880, 883-84 (1958); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 comment b (1976); W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, supra
note 3, § 112, at 796 ("to be libelous per se, the publication must, on its face and without
aid of extrinsic facts, be recognized as injurious").
Some cases indicate that libel per quod may yet be actionable per se if the defam-
atory words fall into one of the four per se categories of slander law. See, e.g., Pollitt v.
Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc., 214 Md. 570, 574, 577, 136 A.2d 573, 575, 577 (1957)
(libel was actionable per se because it imputed criminal conduct and conduct incompati-
ble with plaintiffs duties as sheriff); see generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 112, at 763 (4th ed. 1971).
33. Thompson v. Upton, 218 Md. 433, 146 A.2d 880 (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 569 comment b (1976).
34. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 3, § 5.14, at 388-89; W. PROSSER & W. KEA-
TON, SUpra note 3, § 112, at 796.
35. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
36. Id. at 279-80.
37. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
38. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in result) (ChiefJustice Warren's vote was
essential to the 5-4 decision in Curtis Publishing.)
39. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
40. Id. at 347-48.
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that, in cases in which the fault established is less than knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth,4 1 damages must be limited
to compensation for "actual injury"-there can be no award of dam-
ages based on the presumption of harm to reputation. 42 Likewise,
the Court prohibited recovery of punitive damages in such cases.43
The Court left the definition of "actual injury" to state courts, but
noted that "actual injury" encompasses more than pecuniary loss,
and may include "impairment of reputation and standing in the
community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and
suffering. "
4 4
In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,45 the Supreme Court addressed an is-
sue close to that presented in Hearst. The Florida Supreme Court
had affirmed an award of damages based solely on emotional dis-
tress in a negligent defamation action.46 On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, appellant argued that such recovery was in-
consistent with Gertz-that unless the "actual injury" shown to sat-
isfy Gertz included injury to reputation, the action was by definition
not for defamation. 47 The Court held that the Florida court's deci-
sion to permit recovery for other injuries without regard to reputa-
tion "does not transform the action into something other than an
action for defamation as that term is meant in Gertz."'48 Noting that
Gertz had contemplated that "actual injury" could include "personal
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering,"' 49 the Court held
that appellee's decision to "forego recovery for injury to her reputa-
tion" would not prevent compensation for such other injuries.50
C. State Law After Gertz and Firestone
Firestone established that constitutional law does not require
proof of injury to reputation. It can still be argued, however, that
state common law, as modified by Gertz, does require such proof.
Two states, New York and Kansas, have held that their law, in light
41. I.e., less than the actual malice standard of New York Times.
42. 418 U.S. at 349.
43. Id. at 350.
44. Id. at 349-50.
45. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
46. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974).
47. 424 U.S. at 460.
48. Id. According to the Court, the Gertz opinion "made it clear that states could
base awards on elements other than injury to reputation, specifically listing 'personal
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering' as examples of injuries which might be
compensated consistently with the Constitution ..... Id.
49. Id. (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50).
50. Id.
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of Gertz, requires proof of injury to reputation in negligent defama-
tion actions. In Salomone v. MacMillan Publishing Co., 5 the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court interpreted Gertz as having
abolished the presumption of harm to reputation, and held that re-
covery for mental anguish alone was impossible since, under New
York common law, such damage is only compensable when accom-
panied by harm to reputation.5" Similarly, in Gobin v. Globe Publishing
Co.,5" the Supreme Court of Kansas held that the Gertz prohibition
against damages based on presumed injury to reputation would re-
quire plaintiffs to prove injury to reputation, since this is the essence
of defamation under Kansas law.54
Since Firestone, only one state, Louisiana, has joined Florida in
allowing recovery in negligent defamation actions absent proof of
injury to reputation. The Court of Appeal of Louisiana, in Freeman
v. Cooper,5 5 cited the common law rule that in libel suits special or
pecuniary damages need not be proved, and affirmed an award
based solely on mental suffering.56 The court did not discuss the
possible impact of Gertz on the rule.
D. Maryland Law After Gertz and Firestone
Under Maryland common law, courts have traditionally
51. 77 A.D.2d 501, 429 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1980).
52. Id. at 502, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 442-43. The court noted that the language of Gertz
would permit a state to award damages based solely on emotional harm, but said that
New York had declined to make such a change. Id., 429 N.Y.S.2d at 443. The New York
court held the same way in France v. St. Clare's Hosp. & Health Center 82 A.D.2d 1, 3-7,
441 N.Y.S.2d 79, 81-83 (1981). The dissent in that case maintained that the Gertz "ac-
tual injury" requirement would be satisfied as long as there was no award of presump-
tive or punitive damages. Id. at 7-14, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 85-87 (Bloom, J., dissenting).
53. 232 Kan. 1, 649 P.2d 1239 (1982).
54. Id. at 6, 649 P.2d at 1243. ChiefJustice Schroeder, dissenting, criticized the ma-
jority opinion as being "discriminatory in that it does not protect persons libelled whose
reputation cannot be damaged." Id. at 10, 649 P.2d at 1245 (Schroeder, C. J., dissent-
ing). This sounds like a doubtful point, since it is the interest in reputation that defama-
tion law is designed to protect. I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 3, § 5.1, at 349-50;
W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, supra note 3, § 111, at 771. However, Chief Justice Schroe-
der seems to have meant to refer to persons whose reputation cannot be damaged with
pecuniary results, since he wrote that "[olne must ask what can be the pecuniary damage
to a hog farmer's reputation when he is libeled by a publication ....... 232 Kan. at 8,
649 P.2d at 1244 (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting). Actually, damage to reputation need not
have pecuniary consequences; it can be shown by the testimony of witnesses whose opin-
ion of the plaintiffs reputation was lowered by the defamation. But since such testimony
is difficult to obtain, see Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1357 (1975), the Chief
Justice's point is valid.
55. 390 So. 2d 1355 (La. Ct. App. 1980), affd, 414 So. 2d 355 (La. 1982).
56. 390 So. 2d at 1360.
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awarded damages based on the presumption of injury to reputa-
tion.57 The Maryland Court of Appeals recognized the effect of
Gertz on this rule inJacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf,58 holding that a plaintiff
"may recover compensation for actual injury, as defined in Gertz...
but neither presumed nor punitive damages, unless he establishes
liability under the more demanding New York Times standard of
knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth."' 59 Jacron also de-
fined the minimum standard of liability in Maryland defamation ac-
tions to be negligence,6" and held that, under Maryland law, the
Gertz rules apply to non-media defendants as well as media
defendants.61
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals addressed the injury to
reputation issue in IBEW, Local 1805 v. Mayo. 62 In that case the
court affirmed an award of compensatory and punitive damages de-
spite the absence of proof of injury to reputation. The court held
that the case was one of libel per se in which injury to reputation was
presumed, and that the Gertz requirement for proof of "actual in-
jury" was satisfied by a showing of emotional harm.63 On certiorari,
the Court of Appeals affirmed on a different ground: Since the
plaintiff had established fault by the "actual malice" standard, the
Gertz rules regarding damages did not apply.64 Thus, it remained
undetermined whether, after Gertz, Maryland defamation law re-
quires proof of injury to reputation in negligent defamation per se
actions .65
III. ANALYSIS
In Hearst Corp. v. Hughes, the Maryland Court of Appeals held
57. See, e.g., M & S Furniture v. DeBartolo Corp., 249 Md. 540, 544, 241 A.2d 126,
128 (1968); Newbold v. Bradstreet, 57 Md. 38, 52-53 (1881).
58. 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).
59. Id. at 601, 350 A.2d at 700.
60. Id. at 596-97, 350 A.2d at 697-98.
61. Id. at 592, 350 A.2d at 695.
62. 35 Md. App. 169, 370 A.2d 130, aff'd on other grounds, 281 Md. 475, 379 A.2d
1223 (1977).
63. Id. at 179-80, 370 A.2d at 135-36.
64. IBEW, Local 1805 v. Mayo, 281 Md. 475, 482, 379 A.2d 1223, 1227 (1977).
65. Another related Maryland case is Metromedia, Inc. v. Hillman, 285 Md. 161, 400
A.2d 1117 (1979), in which the court recognized that, after Gertz, the only remaining
distinction between libel per se and libel per quod is the necessity of proving extrinsic
facts to show the defamatory nature of the communication in per quod cases. Id. at 162-
63, 400 A.2d at 1118-19. As to the former difference regarding presumed damages, the
court said that "[slince nominal or presumed damages no longer exist, in all libel actions
Maryland pleading principles require the same type of pleading as to damages as was
formerly necessary in libel per quod." Id.
696 [VOL. 44:688
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that plaintiffs in negligent per se defamation actions can still recover
damages without proving injury to reputation.66 The defendant
Hearst had argued that, since Gertz abolished the presumption of
injury to reputation, such recovery violates the essence of the tort.67
The Court of Appeals viewed this argument as a misinterpretation
of Gertz, and held that the presumption still exists for purposes of
supplying the essential element of defamation.6' The court sup-
ported its holding with an analogy to the law of nominal damages in
defamation, 69 and with a policy argument regarding the need to re-
lieve plaintiffs of the difficult burden of proving injury to reputa-
tion.7" An analysis of the court's reasoning reveals that the court
was correct in its interpretation of Gertz and reached the appropriate
result in allowing plaintiff to recover without proving harm to
reputation.
A. Interpretation of Gertz
The position advanced by Hearst began with the proposition
that injury to reputation is the gravamen of defamation-that "ab-
sent harm to reputation, there may be a tort, but it is not the tort of
defamation."-7' At common law, the presumption of injury to repu-
tation functioned to assure that this essential element was present in
certain cases in which it was not actually proven.72 Hearst argued
66. 297 Md. 112, 130-31, 466 A.2d 486, 495 (1983).
67. Id. at 126, 466 A.2d at 493. This was also the dissent's position. Id. at 139-44,
466 A.2d at 499-502 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 127, 466 A.2d at 493.
69. Id. at 127-29, 466 A.2d at 494-95.
70. Id. at 129-30, 466 A.2d at 495.
71. Id. at 126, 466 A.2d at 493. The argument used by Hearst was presented by
Eaton in The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond:
An Analytical Primer, supra note 54, at 1432-39. According to Eaton, "[a] claim that one
has been diefamed is a claim that his reputation has been injured, not that a falsehood
has been published about him; it is the damage and not the insult which is the cause of
action." Id. at 1437. However, it is unclear whether actual injury to reputation is re-
quired, or whether it is sufficient that the words be of the sort that would tend to injure
reputation. See supra note 25. The Maryland cases regarding this point cited by the
dissent, see 297 Md. at 143-44, 466 A.2d at 501-02, actually tend to support the latter
view. See, e.g., Negley v. Farrow, 60 Md. 158, 175 (1883) ("[Any publication which tends
to injure one's reputation, and expose him to hatred or contempt, if made without lawful
excuse, is libellous.") (emphasis added).
72.
A claim that one has been defamed is a claim that his reputation has
been injured, not that a falsehood has been published about him . . . . The
common law maintained this theoretical underpinning by presuming injury to
reputation where the defamatory statement was actionable per se, and even
where it required proof of special damages it allowed recovery of presumed
general damages for injury to reputation once that showing was made.
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that Gertz had abolished the presumption for cases of negligent defa-
mation.73 Thus, to maintain the integrity of the tort, it would be
necessary for plaintiffs in all negligent defamation actions to prove
injury to reputation.74
The Court of Appeals responded to this argument by rejecting
the assertion that Gertz abolished the presumption of injury to repu-
tation. According to the Court, the presumption still exists after
Gertz and should apply in the present case: "[H]ere there is a publi-
cation of false and defamatory matter,from which harm to reputation is
presumed. The tort is defamation even though the harm proven to
satisfy Gertz is emotional distress."75 The court held that the distinc-
tion made in Gertz between cases in which "actual malice" is estab-
lished and cases of negligent defamation "goes to the degree of the
defendant's fault and to damages, not to whether the cause of action
is one for the protection of the interest in freedom from harm to
reputation."" The Court apparently viewed Gertz as having abol-
ished only the award of damages based on the presumption of in-
jury, not the presumption itself; the presumption would still exist
for the purpose of characterizing a tort as one of defamation.
The Court of Appeals' interpretation of Gertz's effect on the
presumption is correct, as a careful review of that opinion demon-
strates. At no point in the Gertz opinion did the Supreme Court
state that the presumption is abolished or refer in any way to what
constitutes a cause of action in defamation.7 7 Rather, the thrust of
Eaton, supra note 54, at 1437. See also W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, supra note 3, § 112, at
795.
73. "[T]he Court in Gertz . . . eradicated the common law's ancient presumption of
injury for defamatory statements actionable per se." Eaton, supra note 54, at 1432.
74. "If the essence of the law of defamation is to be preserved in the wake of the
Court's destruction of the conclusive presumption of injury, a defamation plaintiff must
first prove impairment of reputation before he is entitled to recover for personal humili-
ation and mental anguish and suffering." Id. at 1438-39. See also W. PROSSER & W.
KEATON, supra note 3, § 113, at 797 ("It would seem ... that courts should require as a
minimum for recovery in every case either evidence from which harm to reputation
could reasonably be inferred or direct evidence of harm to reputation.")
It has also been argued that allowing recovery for emotional injury alone would
constitute a return to the presumption of injury prohibited by Gertz. See infra note 96.
75. 297 Md. at 127, 466 A.2d at 493 (emphasis added).
76. Id., 466 A.2d at 494.
77. Eaton cites several passages from Gertz to support the idea that Gertz had abol-
ished the presumption of injury to reputation, none of which provide clear support.
Eaton, supra note 54, at 1432-33. First, Eaton notes the Court's statement that the state
interest in compensating for injury to reputation "extends no further than compensa-
tion for actual injury." Id. at 1433 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
349 (1974)). Second, Eaton incorrectly cites the Court as referring to the presumption
as "an oddity of tort law" which "invites juries to punish unpopular opinion." Id. More
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the "actual injury" passage was to limit the recovery of presumed or
punitive damages to cases in which liability is based "on a showing
of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth."-78 The
Court was concerned with the "largely uncontrolled discretion of
juries to award damages where there is no loss," '79 and attempted to
eliminate this problem by preventing the award of damages based
on the presumption. There could have been no point, however, in
eradicating the presumption's function of providing the essential el-
ement of defamation, since this would not affect the discretion of
juries in awarding damages.8 ° Thus, the Maryland court in Hearst
was correct in concluding that Gertz was not intended to affect the
role of the presumption in supplying an essential element for the
tort of defamation.
B. Analogy to the Law of Nominal Damages
The Court of Appeals went on to support its holding by citing
the Restatement position on the status of nominal damages in defama-
tion after Gertz."' Section 620 of the Second Restatement of Torts main-
tains that -[o]ne who is liable for a slander actionable per se or for a
libel is liable for at least nominal damages."82 Comment a to this
section explains that nominal damages are awarded when "no sub-
stantial harm has been done to [plaintiff's] reputation."'8' The court
also cited other authorities taking the same position, 4 and pointed
out that allowing the award of nominal damages without proof of
accurately, it was "the common law of defamation" which the Court called "an oddity of
tort law", and it was "the doctrine of presumed damages" which the Court said "invites
juries to punish unpopular opinion." 418 U.S. at 349. The general context of these
remarks was a criticism of "[t]he largely uncontrolled discretion ofjuries to award dam-
ages", not the presumption of injury to reputation. Id. Finally, Eaton cites the passage
that begins: "It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual injury."
Eaton, supra note 54, at 1433 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50). None of the passages
speaks of abolishing the presumption; they merely prohibit the award of damages based
on it.
Of course it could be argued that prohibiting the award of damages in effect
amounts to the same thing as abolishing the presumption. But to the extent that one
accepts the proposition, central to Eaton's analysis, that the presumption has the extra
function of providing an essential element of a cause of action in defamation, see supra
note 71, one must accept that the presumption retains a meaningful purpose after Gertz.
78. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
79. Id.
80. But see infra note 96.
81. 297 Md. at 127-28, 466 A.2d at 494.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 620 (1976).
83. Id. comment a.
84. 297 Md. at 127-28, 466 A.2d at 494 (citing L. ELDREDGE, THE LAw OF DEFAMA-
700 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 44:688
any kind of harm indicates that proof of harm to reputation is not an
essential element of the tort.8 5
The dissent raised two objections to the majority's analysis of
nominal damages. One objection was that comment c to section
620 expresses reservations about the validity of the section in light
of Gertz. 6 This objection was ill-founded, since the reservations in
comment c go to whether actual injury of any type will be a prerequi-
site to nominal damages, as it is for other damages, not to whether
injury to reputation specifically will be a prerequisite.87 The Restate-
ment's recognition that the actual injury requirement might extend
even to nominal damages does not diminish the importance of its
recognition that a cause of action in defamation is possible without
proof of injury to reputation.
The second objection raised by the dissent was that in Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. Hillman8" the Maryland court had declared that nom-
inal damages no longer exist in Maryland after Gertz,8" thus
contradicting the Restatement rule.90 The majority reserved judg-
TION § 95.b, at 541 (1978); R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § VII.2.1,
at 345 (1980)).
85. 297 Md. at 128, 466 A.2d at 494.
Inasmuch as these authorities would allow a judgment for the plaintiff, albeit
for nominal damages, in cases in which no harm at all has been proven, they do
not view proof of harm to reputation as an essential element of the tort. A
fortioi, these same authorities would allow judgment for the plaintiff in a case of
per se defamation where harm is proven, by way of emotional distress, without
proof of harm to reputation.
Id.
86. Id. at 138, 466 A.2d at 499. (Davidson, J., dissenting).
87. The actual language of the Restatement is:
The effect of [Gertz] on the granting of an award for nominal damages when
there is no proof of some actual injury thus remains in some doubt. . . . It
seems likely that the constitutional restriction will be confined to preventing
the awarding of the common law "presumed damages" without proof as to
what the damages are. On the other hand, it is possible that the Court will hold
that the Constitution requires proof of actual harm as a necessary requisite for
the existence of any liability for defamation . ... "
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 620 comment c (1976) (emphasis added). "Actual
harm" ("actual injury") was defined by the Court to include other elements besides in-
jury to reputation. See supra text accompanying note 41. The important point from the
standpoint of the majority's analysis is that the Restatement views it as possible that nomi-
nal damages may be recoverable absent proof of injury, thus indicating that the Restate-
ment does not consider proof of injury to reputation to be essential to a cause of action in
defamation.
88. 285 Md. 161, 400 A.2d 1117 (1979).
89. Id. at 168, 400 A.2d at 1121. "[U]nder Gertz we were no longer permitted to
impose liability on the media without fault, as e.g., by permitting recovery of nominal
damages." Id.
90. 297 Md. at 138-39, 466 A.2d at 499 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
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ment on whether Metromedia had actually abolished nominal dam-
ages in Maryland, and implied that in any case the Restatement
position reflects the continued role of the presumption in supplying
an element of defamation.9" The important point is that the Restate-
ment recognizes the possibility of a defamation action without proof
of injury to reputation; it is irrelevant that the particular type of ac-
tion cited may be prohibited in Maryland.
Thus, the court was justified in citing the Restatement rule on
nominal damages as support for its holding. In fact, the Restatement
supports the court's position even more directly elsewhere. In ana-
lyzing the effect of Gertz on the award of common law general dam-
ages, comment b to section 621 states that "[t]he Constitution does
not require proof of impairment of reputation before damages for
emotional distress can be recovered. . . . [The] constitutional limi-
tation is on damages that may be recovered, not on the existence of
a cause of action. "92 This clear statement regarding the effect of
Gertz provides authoritative support for the court's holding that Gertz
did not abolish the presumption's function in providing the essen-
tial element of defamation.
C. Policy Considerations
The Court of Appeals concluded by discussing the policy con-
siderations involved in its decision. Noting that "centuries of
human experience" 93 had led to the presumption, it emphasized
that "[o]ne reason for the common law position was the difficulty a
defamation plaintiff has in proving harm to reputation."94 The
plaintiff must attempt to locate witnesses willing to testify that their
opinion of the plaintiff has been affected by a falsehood; any other
testimony regarding reputation is likely to be hearsay. 95
91. Id. at 128-29, 466 A.2d at 494-95.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621 comment b (1976).
93. 297 Md. at 129, 466 A.2d at 495.
94. Id.
95. The court quoted from Eaton in this regard:
The conclusive presumption of injury for certain kinds of defamation derives
from the recognition that injury to reputation is extremely difficult to demon-
strate, even when it is obvious that serious harm has resulted. Identifying and
locating those persons in the community who may think less highly of the plain-
tiff because of the publication is difficult . . . .And once located, it is the rare
witness who will admit to the plaintiff or testify in court that his attitudes to-
ward the plaintiff have changed as a result of the publication, when by doing so
he admits that he changed his opinion without determining the truth or falsity
of the statement.
Ordinarily, the plaintiff will be able to present witnesses who will testify
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The court also stressed that requiring proof of harm to reputa-
tion is not necessary to protect defendants. Defendants have, under
constitutional law, a broad range of protections against vexations
defamation actions, including the prohibitions against liability with-
out fault, punitive damages, and presumed damages.9 6 In conclu-
only that the plaintiff's reputation had been good, that their own opinion of the
plaintiff has not changed, but that the plaintiff's general reputation in the com-
munity has suffered as a result of the publication. This kind of testimony often
lacks credibility because it is bottomed on hearsay and imputes to others a
change in attitude which the witnesses themselves thought unnecessary.
Eaton, supra note 54, at 1357, quoted in 297 Md. at 129-30, 466 A.2d at 495.
96. 297 Md. at 130, 466 A.2d at 495.
On the other hand, it has been argued that allowing recovery for emotional
harm, absent proof of injury to reputation, would vitiate the protections of Gertz:
It is difficult to see how injuries such as "personal humiliation" and "mental
anguish" can be established except by a process that in practice will be little
different from presuming them. . . . [E]motional injuries, though not pre-
sumed, will be inferred. Such an insignificant change in practice seems unlikely
to reduce substantially the amount of awards for emotional injuries.
The new rule must be given further effect. In the absence of a demon-
stration of Times recklessness, Gertz should preclude recovery for emotional in-
juries unaccompanied by injury to relational interests.
Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422, 472 (1975). Brennan cited
Anderson in his dissent to Firestone, making the same point:
Gertz would, of course, allow for an award of damages for [mental pain and
anguish] after proof of injury to reputation. But to allow such damages without
proof "by competent evidence" of any other "actual injury" is to do nothing
less than return to the old rule of presumed damages supposedly outlawed by
Gertz in instances where the New York Times standard is not met.
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 475 n.3 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
Anderson, supra) (other citations omitted). Brennan also feared that allowing recovery
for emotional harm alone would lead to self-censorship by publishers:
[T]he allowance of damages for mental suffering alone will completely abrogate
the use of summary judgment procedures in defamation litigation. The use of
such summary procedures may be a critical factor enabling publishers to avoid
large litigation expenses in marginal and frivolous defamation suits. The spec-
ter of such expenses may be as potent a force for self-censorship as any threat
of an ultimate damages award.
Id. (citations omitted). A number of commentators have approved of Brennan's dissent.
See, e.g., Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy Making, 61 MINN. L.
REV. 645, 669-72 (1977); Comment, Time, Inc. v. Firestone: Sowing the Seeds of Gertz, 43
BROOKLYN L. REV. 123, 137-40 (1976); Recent Case, Constitutional Law-First Amend-
ment-Freedom of the Press-Libel-Constitutional Privilege-nvolvememt in Prior Litigation Does
Not Make a Plaintiff in a Libel Action a Public Figure for Purposes of the New York Times "Actual
Malice" Test.-Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), 45 CIN. L. REV. 685, 692
(1976); Note, Defamation Law After Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 13 IDAHO L. REV. 53, 63-64
(1976).
In contrast, some authors have approved of allowing recovery for emotional in-
jury alone. See Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6 RUT.-CAM. LJ. 471, 504-05 (1975), Robertson,
Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L.
REV. 199, 231-34 (1976); Note, Libel and the First Amendment, 56 NEB. L. REV. 366, 378-79
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sion, the court stated that, for plaintiffs who can prove genuine
emotional distress as well as the other elements of defamation, no
useful purpose would be served by requiring proof of actual impair-
ment of reputation.9 7
The court's policy reasoning is valid. The burdensome effect of
requiring plaintiffs to prove injury to reputation was recognized by
Justice White in his dissent to Gerlz.9 8 According to White, "damage
to reputation is recurringly difficult to prove and. . . requiring ac-
tual proof would repeatedly destroy any chance for adequate com-
pensation." 99  One commentator has even suggested that the
difficulty in proving harm to reputation justifies extending the pre-
sumption beyond the traditional categories of libel and slander per
se. 10° Even those who favor the idea that, after Gertz, injury to repu-
(1977) (arguing that the requirement for competent evidence of actual injury "controls
an argument that the Court has returned to presumed damages and punishment of mi-
nority views because the awards cannot extend beyond the facts" since "awards for ac-
tual injury have to be supported by competent evidence"). Robertson took the
viewpoint that the self-censorship feared by Brennan might not be an evil: "Unless one
believes in some a priori sense that self-censorship must be avoided at all costs, the law's
normal respect for deterring harmful behavior and compensating injury supports the
awards in Firestone ...... Robertson, supra, at 234. Robertson also argued that
although a liberal interpretation of the "actual injury" requirement might constitute a
return to presumed damages, "(t)he continued award of damages based on inferential
injury does not vitiate the Gertz damages holding, since the limitation on punitive dam-
ages will still significantly reduce recoveries." Id. at 232.
Assuming that Brennan's fears about speculative emotional damages are justi-
fied, abolishing the presumption of injury still would not cure the situation, since many
plaintiffs would succeed in proving injury to reputation and go on to collect damages for
emotional harm. Anderson recognized this, stating that the abuses that Gertz sought to
prevent would not be reduced "if the prohibition against presumed damages were re-
moved once an actual injury to reputation was shown. . . . [C]ourts must guard against
presumptions of humiliation and mental anguish from the mere existence of an injury to
reputation." Anderson, supra, at 472-73.
97. 297 Md. at 130-31, 466 A.2d at 495.
98. 418 U.S. at 394 (White, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (citing W. PROSSER, supra note 32 § 112, at 765) ("[I]t is clear that proof of
actual damage will be impossible in a great many cases where, from the character of the
defamatory words and the circumstances of publication, it is all but certain that serious
harm has resulted in fact."); Note, Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV.
875, 891-92 (1956) ("The harm resulting from an injury to reputation is difficult to
demonstrate both because it may involve subtle differences in the conduct of the recipi-
ents toward the plaintiff and because the recipients, the only witnesses able to establish
the necessary causal connection, may be reluctant to testify that the publication affected
their relationships with the plaintiff. Thus some presumptions are necessary if the plain-
tiff is to be adequately compensated.").
100. See Frakt, supra note 96, at 504-05.
As the law now stands, a state court could possibly rule that even
though proof of emotional distress and resulting illness satisfied the constitu-
tional requirement for damages in libel actions, the same proof was still insuffi-
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tation must be proved in all negligent defamation cases, admit the
hardship this rule may work on plaintiffs.' 0 ' It has been suggested
that these effects might be ameliorated by abandoning the common
law rule that pecuniary damages (i.e. special damages) must be
proved in cases in which the presumption does not operate.102
However, the difficulties of proving injury to reputation are separate
from problems of proving pecuniary damages. The Court of Ap-
peals is justified in concluding that a requirement for proof of injury
to reputation would impose a substantial hardship on plaintiffs.
IV. CONCLUSION
The theoretical argument that plaintiffs in negligent defamation
per se actions should now be required to prove harm to reputation
is based on a mistaken interpretation of Gertz as having abolished
the common law presumption of harm. That interpretation lacks
textual support in the Gertz opinion, is not required constitutionally,
and does not serve the purposes sought to be achieved by Gertz.
Moreover, there are practical policy reasons for retaining the pre-
sumption, and these should carry more weight than theoretical con-
siderations. Thus, the Maryland Court of Appeals reached the
appropriate result in Hearst v. Hughes Corp. in reaffirming the role of
the presumption in Maryland common law. Other states may decide
that opposing policy considerations require abolishing the pre-
sumption, but this step should not be taken under the pretense that
it is mandated by Gertz.
cient under state law in a slander case . ... Consequently, in view of the Gertz
requirement of findings of fault and actual damages in all defamation cases, the
fact that special damages have been given fairly expansive treatment in recent
years, and the confusion in terminology, it must be concluded that the li-
bel/slander distinction is no longer viable and should be completely
eliminated.
Id.
101. See Eaton, supra note 54, at 1436:
A requirement for proof of actual injury will, of course, be difficult in many
cases. Commentators have often observed that such a requirement would con-
siderably reduce any chance for adequate compensation, even in those cases
where it is virtually certain that serious harm has resulted . . . . It remains to
be seen what effect the new requirement for proof of injury will have in barring
seriously wronged and seriously injured plaintiffs from recovering adequate
compensation. The height of the barrier for defamed plaintiffs may depend to
a large extent on the nature of the rules of evidence adopted concerning proof
of injury to reputation.
Id.
102. Id.
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